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The distinction between episodic and semantic memory, proposed by Endel Tulving in 
1972, remains a key concept in contemporary Cognitive Neuroscience. Here we review how 
this distinction evolved in Tulving`s writings over the years. Crucially, from 1972 onward, he 
argued that the two forms of memory were inter-dependent and that their interaction was 
an essential feature of normal episodic memory function. Moreover, later elaborations of the 
theory clearly proposed that these interactions formed the basis of normal declarative 
memory functioning. A later but crucial aspect of Tulving’s contribution was his stress on the 
importance of subjective experience, which, according to him, “should be the ultimate object 
of interest, the central aspect of remembering that is to be explained and understood”. We 
relate these and his numerous other ideas to current perspectives about the organization and 
function of human memory. 
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 ‘The term "memory" itself has become just an umbrella term covering all the different kinds, 
and one-time dreams of psychologists of coming up with a comprehensive "theory of memory" 
have become as irrelevant as psychological theories about umbrellas’  
(Tulving, 2007).  
 
Endel Tulving first formally proposed the distinction between episodic and semantic memory 
in a book chapter dating from 1972 (Tulving, 1972). The distinction became extremely 
influential in memory research, both in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience, 
and is still of central importance today. Here we review how this distinction evolved over the 
years in Tulving’s writings, including his celebrated book from 1983, “Elements of Episodic 
Memory”. We focus on the development of Tulving’s ideas and their impact on 
contemporaneous and subsequent research, rather than providing a comprehensive review 
of the episodic/semantic distinction. For a recent review of current perspectives on this topic, 
see Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch, & Rugg (2019). 
 
1. 1972 Conception 
In his 1972 book chapter, Tulving noted the “looseness” and “ambiguity” of the concept of 
memory and the importance of developing taxonomies of cognitive processes. He referred to 
semantic memory as a new conception of memory, first described by Quillian (1966), and 
then elaborated by Kintsch (1972), Collins and Quillian (1972) and Rumelhart, Lindsay and 
Norman (1972) in presentations at a conference on “organizational processes in memory”, 
organized by Tulving in Pittsburgh in 1971. Tulving later explained that he wrote his 1972 
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chapter “in reaction”  (Tulving, 1984a) to these presentations (later published in the same 
volume as that in which Tulving’s chapter appeared), that left him in “deep puzzlement” about 
this new emerging field of semantic memory, that he thought had more to do with the 
“understanding of language” and “much less relevance for remembering events” or for the 
“acquisition and recall of word lists” (Tulving, 1983, page 20; see also Tulving, 1987a). 
In the 1972 chapter, Tulving contrasted semantic memory with another kind of memory that 
he termed “episodic memory”. He referred to these two kinds of memory as “stores” or 
“systems”, but presented this distinction as a “pre-theoretical position” that did not imply that 
they were necessarily functionally distinct in any deep sense. Thus, this first conceptualization 
did not make a strong claim for two separate memory systems. Only in subsequent writings 
(e.g., Tulving, 1983, 1984a) did he make the assumption that the two systems were 
functionally distinct, in the sense that “one system can operate independently of the other” 
and that they were “governed at least partially by different principles” (Tulving, 1983, page 
66). Tulving (1983) was aware that this functional distinction would likely court controversy. 
However, he expressed optimism about “the possibility of distinguishing between the two 
systems on neuroanatomical and neurophysiological grounds” and thus on their structural 
independence (Tulving, 1983, page 66; see also Tulving, 1986 and section 2.5), and cited 
studies of the effects of brain lesions in support of his position (Cermak, 1981; Mair, 
Warrington, & Weiskrantz, 1979; Squire, 1982; Victor, Adams, & Collins, 1971). 
In the 1972 chapter, Tulving recognized that the distinction between semantic and episodic 
memory was not without precedent, similar distinctions having long been proposed in the 
philosophical literature (e.g., Bergson, 1911; Furlong, 1951; Russell, 1921). He noted however 
that “the philosophical categories of memory have not had any influence on psychological 
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research” (Tulving, 1972; while recognising Reiff & Scheerer, 1959 as an exception to this 
rule). A more nuanced position was adopted in his 1983 book, in which prior psychological 
writings describing similar distinctions are also cited (e.g., Bruner, 1969; Claparede, 1911). Of 
importance, both in the original 1972 chapter and subsequently Tulving argued that the two 
systems interact and are “partially overlapping” (Tulving, 1972) or, as stated later, that they 
are “closely interdependent and interact with one another virtually all the time”, (Tulving, 
1983, page 65) 
 
Definition of Episodic Memory. In the 1972 chapter episodic memory was defined as a 
memory “system” that “receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or 
events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events” (Tulving, 1972). Although he 
recognized that the temporal contiguity between items was an important factor in the 
encoding of associative information in episodic memory, he argued that contiguity was not 
necessary for such encoding, hence his use of the more general term temporal-spatial 
“relations” in his definition. The paper also included the much simpler definition of episodic 
as memories for “personally experienced unique events” (Tulving, 1972).  
 
Commentary: The basic notion of episodic memory as memory for unique events has changed 
little up to the present day (e.g., Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel, 2016; Rugg, Johnson, 
& Uncapher, 2015; Schacter & Madore, 2016). However, as we will see, this early definition 
was qualified and expanded over the years in Tulving’s writings, and some important 
elements were added (notably, in respect of the important role of phenomenal experience or 
‘autonoetic consciousness’, see section 2.2).  
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Definition of Semantic Memory. In the 1972 chapter semantic memory was defined as “the 
memory necessary for the use of language. It is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a 
person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about 
relations about them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these 
symbols, concepts and relations” (Tulving, 1972). Semantic memory thus had the capacity for 
“inferential reasoning and generalization” (Tulving, 1972), contrary to episodic memory, a 
capacity that was considered as its most important property by Quillian (1966). Moreover, 
semantic memory was held to contain no record of how its content was acquired, and thus 
learning in semantic memory was considered an unknown parameter (contrary to episodic 
memory): “since input conditions responsible for the existing semantic structure are usually 
not known (…), the experimenter simply cannot be concerned with correspondences and 
discrepancies between input and output” (Tulving, 1972). Indeed, studying established 
semantic concepts would not allow one to make inferences on how these concepts were 
initially learned. Finally, it was also proposed that, as both semantic and episodic memory 
contain “mnemonic information for verbal materials” (Tulving, 1972), they would frequently 
interact.   
 
Commentary: In contrast to episodic memory, the concept of semantic memory has evolved 
considerably over the years, compared to this initial definition. In Tulving’s original view, as 
in the literature of the time, semantic memory was tightly linked to language comprehension. 
His later definitions were more flexible and proposed that, although language plays a more 
important role in representing information in semantic than in episodic memory, not all 
semantic knowledge is acquired though language (Tulving, 1983, page 41, see also Tulving, 
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2005). This latter conceptualization is more resonant with current perspectives proposing that 
the ability to assign meaning to percepts does not necessarily depend on language (e.g., 
Binder & Desai, 2011; Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017; Martin, 2007, 
2016). Further, the notion that semantic memory does “not register perceptible properties of 
inputs, but rather cognitive referents” (Tulving, 1972), stands in contrast to current 
perspectives in which semantic memory is “embodied” or “grounded” in perception and 
action, and emerges out of interactions between modality-specific and amodal information 
(e.g., Binder & Desai, 2011; Lambon Ralph, et al., 2017; Martin, 2016; Matheson & Barsalou, 
2018).  
Tulving’s (1972) observation that inputs to semantic memory are generally unknown still 
appears to be valid. Episodic memory is typically studied, at least in the laboratory, by 
investigating correspondences between inputs (i.e., study items) and outputs (i.e., memory 
for the items). In semantic memory experiments, however, we typically have little 
experimental control over the acquisition of semantic and conceptual knowledge, only over 
their expression. An exception to this situation are studies that investigated learning of new 
concepts in children and adults (e.g., Murphy, 2002). Whereas early investigations suggested 
that very extensive study was necessary to link new concepts to existing conceptual structures 
(Dagenbach, Horst, & Carr, 1990), more recent findings suggest that fast semantic learning is 
possible, even to the extent of a single (Borovsky, Elman, & Kutas, 2012; Borovsky, Kutas, & 
Elman, 2010; S. Chen, Wang, & Yang, 2014; Ding, Chen, Wang, & Yang, 2017; Zhang, Chen, 
Wang, Yang, & Yang, 2017) or only a few  trials (e.g., Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2015), 




Distinctions between Episodic and Semantic memory. According to the 1972 chapter, 
episodic memory has an “autobiographical reference”, whereas semantic memory is 
“detached from autobiographical reference” (Tulving, 1972; see section 2.2 for further 
discussion on episodic and autobiographical memory). Perceptual characteristics of stimuli 
are stored in episodic memory (and thus episodic memory would be a “more or less faithful 
record of personal experience” whereas semantic memory encodes “cognitive referents of 
input signals” (Tulving, 1972), rather than perceptual information. Tulving (1972) went on to 
argue that semantic memory was much more related to learning in the classroom than 
episodic memory is, “as classroom learning has little to do with students’ remembering 
personally experienced events” (Tulving, 1972). It was further proposed that an act of retrieval 
can modify the content of episodic memory, but not that of semantic memory. That is, 
retrieval from either semantic or episodic memory constitutes an episode that could 
potentially be “re-encoded” in episodic memory. Finally, semantic memory was held to be 
less prone to forgetting than episodic memory. 
 
Commentary: Some of the criteria and properties differentiating the two systems described 
in Tulving’s 1972 chapter are still accepted today, even as they have evolved over the years 
(see section 2). The autobiographical reference of episodic memory is uncontroversial, and 
episodic memories are still typically defined as referring to personally experienced events. 
Much research has been conducted in recent years on such topics as memory reconsolidation, 
updating, and integration, resonating with Tulving’s (1972) idea that retrieval can produce 
modification and re-encoding of episodic memories (Antony, Ferreira, Norman, & Wimber, 
2017; Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007; Loftus, 1975; Schlichting & Preston, 2015; 
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Schooler, Foster, & Loftus, 1988; Scully, Napper, & Hupbach, 2017). Additionally, while in the 
1972 chapter, Tulving assumed that semantic memory was less vulnerable to loss of 
information, interference and forgetting than episodic memory (Tulving, 1972), later 
elaborations went further and explicitly proposed that information in episodic memory 
(based on a single learning event) was more fragile than typically highly overlearned semantic 
information (Tulving, 1983, page 45). The idea that episodic memories are vulnerable to rapid 
forgetting also resonates with current views (Barry & Maguire, 2019; Conway, 2009; Yassa & 
Reagh, 2013), although it is unclear how one could overcome the confounding effects of such 
factors as differential study exposures and retrieval opportunities when attempting to 
compare forgetting rates for episodic and semantic information. Additionally, semantic 
learning is typically considered to be slower than hippocampally-mediated episodic learning 
(e.g., McClelland, McNaughton, & Oreilly, 1995; Norman, 2010). 
 
2. Re-conceptualization of the 1972 model 
As noted previously, over the years Tulving modified, elaborated and ultimately largely re-
conceptualized the constructs of semantic and episodic memory. In this section, we describe 
what we consider the most significant of these developments. 
 
2.1. Developments related to both systems 
Episodic and Semantic memory are propositional (declarative) 
In the 1983 book, Tulving proposed that both semantic and episodic memory are 
“propositional”, meaning that their contents can be represented and expressed consciously, 
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have a truth value, and can be acquired from a single learning experience, in contrast to the 
functional properties of procedural memory (see also Cohen & Squire, 1980; M. A. Wheeler, 
Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). An important development in Tulving’s thinking came with his 
realization that performance on standard tests of long-term memory does not exclusively 
depend upon episodic memory (Tulving, 1983; see also Mandler, 1980; Weiskrantz & 
Warrington, 1975  for similar ideas originating around the same time).  
 
Standard recognition and recall tasks are not process-pure 
In the 1972 chapter, laboratory tasks in which participants are asked to recall or recognize 
word lists were considered quintessential episodic memory tasks. Tulving (1972) proposed 
that in such tasks (which he later referred to as evaluating peoples’ memory for “miniature 
events”; Tulving 1983, page 144), “the occurrence of a verbal item in a given list, at a particular 
time, and in specified temporal relation to other items in the list is an autobiographical episode 
having no necessary extra-episode denotative reference” (Tulving, 1972). Although he 
recognized that, if familiar words are used as the experimental materials, episodic memory 
might be encoding the outcome of semantic processing, he assumed that such processing was 
not a necessary precursor to episodic encoding. An exception to this assumption appears in a 
paragraph on guessing responses in memory experiments, where the possibility is noted that 
“the subject retrieves information from his semantic memory in an episodic memory 
experiment” (Tulving, 1972). By this view, therefore, and seemingly at odds with the assertion 
that list learning depends exclusively on episodic memory, it is possible that participants rely 
on semantic rather than episodic memory when performing an episodic memory task. This 
point is elaborated and extended in the 1983 book (Tulving, 1983) and in subsequent writings 
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(e.g., Wheeler et al., 1997). To quote from the book: “most experienced and remembered 
events have factual contents whose characteristics are greatly influenced by semantic 
memory; performance on semantic tasks, on the other hand, may be influenced by episodic 
information” (Tulving, 1983, page 55). One important consequence of episodes having 
semantic content is that it might sometimes be possible to use one system to answer 
questions putatively addressed to the other system (Tulving, 1983, page 64). Nonetheless, 
Tulving continued to argue that one can classify a task as episodic if successful performance 
is not possible without access to information about a specific episode (here, he cites 
“conventional recall and recognition tasks”;). In later writings, Tulving (and his colleagues) 
elaborated this position further and argued that “in terms of memory systems, all tasks are 
multiply determined” (Tulving, 2002b; see also Tulving, 1991; Wheeler et al., 1997).  
 
Commentary: The notion that memory tests are not “process pure” is widely held and has 
formed the basis of several important theoretical developments (Jacoby, 1991; McCabe, 
Roediger, & Karpicke, 2011). The notion is exemplified by “dual process” models of 
recognition memory (Atkinson & Juola, 1973; Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985; Mandler, 1980; 
see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review), in which it is proposed that even a memory judgment as 
seemingly simple as determining whether a test item is “old” or “new” can be supported by 
two functionally and neurally dissociable memory signals. The development of memory tests 
such as the autobiographical interview, inspired by Tulving, also illustrates the point that 
semantic and episodic elements are naturally mixed in narrative recall of personal events, and 
must be separated post-hoc via specialized scoring protocols (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, 
& Moscovitch, 2002).  
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 2.2. Re-conceptualization of episodic memory 
 
Episodic memory is constructive 
The 1972 book chapter proposed that “episodic memory is a more or less faithful record of a 
person’s experiences” (Tulving, 1972). A more nuanced perspective was offered in later 
elaborations of the theory, for instance the proposal that the temporal organization of events 
in episodic memory can be “easily changed or lost” (Tulving, 1983, page 38), and that, 
“although a good deal of remembering is more or less veridical, a good deal of it is not” 
(Tulving, 1983, page 187). The process of ecphory described in the book also entails a 
constructive perspective on memory retrieval (see section below on ecphory).  
 
Commentary: These latter perspectives are a better match than the original one to 
contemporary conceptions of episodic memory that put an important focus on its 
constructive nature (Addis, 2018; Barry & Maguire, 2019; Cheng, Werning, & Suddendorf, 
2016; Conway, 2009; Irish, 2019; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Yassa & Reagh, 2013). For instance, 
some authors note that episodic memories are “summarized and generic” rather than “a 
literal record” of experiences (Conway, 2009), that they typically reflect “only the gist of an 
episode” (Cheng, et al., 2016) and that episodic memory and imagination rely on the same 
neurocognitive processes (Addis, 2018; Irish, 2019).  
Ecphory is a component of the process of retrieval 
In his 1983 book, Tulving introduced the concept of ecphory (adapted from Semon, 1904; see 
also Tulving & Madigan, 1970; Tulving; 1976; 1982) as an “obligatory”, automatic and pre-
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conscious aspect of retrieval, by which a stored memory trace interacts with a retrieval cue 
(Tulving, 1983). Accordingly, engrams (stored memory “traces”) are manifest only when they 
interact with an appropriate retrieval cue. In the process of “synergistic ecphory” a retrieval 
cue activates the engram, leading in term to the emergence in consciousness of a memory of 
the original event. Tulving argued that synergistic ecphory is a “constructive” process that 
“uses components from episodic memory (the engram) as well as semantic memory (the cue)” 
and results in the conscious experience of remembering, such that the rememberer attributes 
the “ecphorized event” to the past  (Tulving, 1983, page 180). In the context of the semantic-
episodic distinction, ecphory can thus be considered as an example of an interaction between 
the two systems. Accordingly, ecphoric information is “an amalgam of episodic and semantic 
information” (Tulving, 1985b). The constructive nature of the process of ecphory is illustrated 
by the fact that the experienced ecphoric information need not exactly correspond to 
information represented in the engram, as it will depend on other factors also, such as the 
nature of the retrieval cue and the cognitive state of the rememberer (Tulving, 1983, page 
187). 
 
Commentary: The concept of synergistic ecphory resonates well with contemporary ideas 
about “pattern completion”, the process by which information belonging to a specific episode 
can be retrieved from episodic memory when cued with a partial or degraded version of the 
original event (e.g., Liu, Gould, Coulson, Ward, & Howard, 2016; Rolls, 2013). As alluded to 
above, the concept is also consistent with contemporary views emphasizing the 
reconstructive aspects of memory. Of interest, Semon’s (1904) terminology has been recently 
incarnated in the notion of ‘engram cells’ –  cells comprising neural assemblies in widely 
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distributed brain regions that are co-activated when a specific event is experienced, and 
whose reactivation (either in response to a retrieval cue or an experimental intervention such 
as optogenetic stimulation) results in retrieval of the event (Rao-Ruiz, Yu, Kushner, & Josselyn, 
2019; Tonegawa, Liu, Ramirez, & Redondo, 2015).  
 
Subjective awareness of remembering is a crucial aspect of episodic recall  
The 1983 book points to the importance of the “subjective awareness of remembering” or 
“recollective experience” (Tulving, 1983, page 10) as a fundamental aspect of episodic 
memory. Indeed, the primary referent of episodic memory is held not to be a chronological 
ordering of events (an “objective” time-line), but rather a sense of traveling along a subjective 
time-line into the past (Tulving, 1983, page 42), later to be termed “mental time travel” 
(Tulving 1985b; 2002b), a perspective similar to that of James’ (1890). Recollection was also 
considered to have a distinct “affective tone” (Tulving, 1983, page 48), analogous to James’ 
“warmth and intimacy” (James, 1890), that would not be present in the actualization of 
knowledge from semantic memory (see also Tulving, 1987). Tulving was at pains to stress the 
importance of these aspects of mnemonic experience, which “should be the ultimate object 
of interest, the central aspect of remembering that is to be explained and understood” 
(Tulving, 1983, page 184).  
Further development of Tulving’s ideas about the centrality of mnemonic experience 
came in 1985 with the introduction of the concept of autonoetic awareness (self-knowing), 
held to provide “the characteristic phenomenal flavor of the experience of remembering” 
(Tulving, 1985b). Autonoetic awareness refers to the ability to ‘transport’ oneself through 
subjective time that is, to engage in mental time travel. A synonymous term “autonoesis” was 
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introduced later (Tulving, 2001b, 2005). This form of awareness was contrasted with the 
noetic (knowing) awareness associated with semantic memory, and to the anoetic awareness 
(non-knowing) associated with procedural memory.  
According to this 1985 perspective, anoetic awareness (characteristic of procedural 
memory) is bound to the present. Even though organisms having only this type of awareness 
may be aware of their current surroundings and internal states, they would not be able to 
project themselves in time. Noetic awareness (associated with semantic memory), by 
contrast, allows an organism to represent objects, concepts and events even in their absence, 
although this awareness is also rooted in the present. Accordingly, the ability to “mentally 
travel in space” (rather than time) was proposed as a property of semantic memory (Tulving, 
2005). Finally, autonoetic awareness (held to be a capacity unique to humans) allows the 
rememberer to mentally travel through time, both to remember past events and to “pre-
experience” future events. This form of awareness was held to be both a “necessary” feature 
of episodic memory (as organisms “cannot remember  without awareness”, Tulving, 1985b; 
see also Tulving, 2002b) and its most distinctive aspect (Tulving, 1995, Wheeler, Stuss, & 
Tulving, 1997). Of importance, it was proposed that autonoetic awareness “includes but 
transcends” noetic awareness (Tulving, 2002a; see also section 2.4: Semantic processing 
always precedes episodic encoding). In the view of Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving (1997), 
autonoetic awareness is not only oriented towards the past and the future, but also concerns 
the “ability to be aware of the self’s present”, something the authors related to William James’ 
“stream of consciousness” (James, 1890), and to provide a sense of continuity to our personal 
experiences. Tulving (1985b) went on to propose the now well-known “Remember-Know” 
paradigm to experimentally differentiate autonoetic and noetic awareness during memory 
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retrieval (and thus retrieval from episodic and semantic memory, respectively; see also 
Gardiner, 2001).  
 
Commentary:  Current research in autobiographical memory often relies heavily on subjective 
reports, such as ratings of vividness, visual perspective or sense of reliving of memories for 
past experiences (e.g., Rubin, Deffler, & Umanath, 2019; Siedlecki, 2015; St Jacques, Szpunar, 
& Schacter, 2017). Obviously, these phenomenologically-derived measures cannot have clear 
equivalents in non-human animals (or in young children, see Episodic memory emerges later 
in development than semantic memory in section 2.4), precluding the comparative study of 
these aspects of memory function (but see Tulving, 2005 for the description of the “spoon 
test”, a test of autonoesis that he proposed could be used in non-human animals). The ability 
of some non-human animals to engage in memory-guided behavior that fulfills the classic 
“what? when? where?” criteria for the operation of episodic memory (Clayton, Bussey, & 
Dickinson, 2003; Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), along with evidence that the neural circuits 
supporting episodic memory seem to be largely conserved through evolution, at least in 
mammals and birds (Allen & Fortin, 2013), calls into question Tulving’s assertion of the 
uniqueness of episodic memory to humans. Tulving’s later writings recognized these findings 
and that “interesting analogues of episodic memory exist in non-human animals” (Tulving, 
2001a), but argued that they did not demonstrate that these episodic (or “episodic-like”) 
forms of memory included autonoesis (Tulving, 2001a, 2005). Interestingly, subjective and 
objective measures of episodic memory can be dissociated in humans, for instance in the case 
of lateral parietal lesions that do not affect the accuracy of memory judgments but lead to a 
reduction in associated confidence ratings (Hower, Wixted, Berryhill, & Olson, 2014; Simons, 
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Peers, Mazuz, Berryhill, & Olson, 2010; see also Berryhill, Phuong, Picasso, Cabeza, & Olson, 
2007; Davidson, et al., 2008). Such findings suggest that the subjective experience of 
recollection that typically accompanies successful episodic retrieval depends on neural 
regions distinct from those that support retrieval itself (see also Bastin, et al., 2019 and the 
role of attribution systems that would translate content reactivation into a subjective 
experience). More generally, subjective and objective measures of episodic memory can 
sometimes be dissociated experimentally, for instance in healthy aging, with some studies 
reporting reduced objective but preserved subjective recollection relative to young adults 
(Duarte, Henson, & Graham, 2008; Duarte, Ranganath, Trujillo, & Knight, 2006; Folville, et al., 
2019; Mark & Rugg, 1998). 
 
Episodic memory and subjective time: Autonoetic awareness versus Chronesthesia 
In the 1983 book, Tulving noted that semantic memory is “actualized” in the present moment 
(page 48) whereas episodic memory is oriented towards the past. In contrast, in 1985 and in 
subsequent writings, Tulving proposed that episodic memory is associated with autonoetic 
awareness (see above) and allows humans to re-experience the past and to pre-experience 
the future, providing an important evolutionary advantage (Tulving, 2005). Tulving proposed 
a related concept, chronesthesia, that first appears in the 1985 paper as synonymous with 
the sense of subjective time (see alsoTulving, 2002a). Here, he cited an article by Bouman and 
Grünbaum (1929), although this was not cited in later publications. The article, in German, is 
entitled “Eine Störung der Chronognosie” (a disturbance of chronognosia) and reports a 
clinical case study of a patient suffering from “disorientation in time” following an “influenza 
psychosis”. The patient is said to understand time as a concept but to be unable to accurately 
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situate in time events that happened after his illness, and thus suffers from an impairment in 
the representation of subjective time (the case is reminiscent of that of the celebrated patient 
KC, see Rosenbaum, et al., 2005; Tulving, 1985b; Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 
1988a). In later writings, Tulving distinguished chronesthesia (the sense of subjective time 
that makes mental time travel possible) from chronognosia, defined as semantic knowledge 
about physical time (Tulving, 2002a; Tulving & Kim, 2007). He recognized that chronesthesia 
was closely related to autonoetic awareness (its “predecessor”, Tulving, 2002a; or a “a 
specifically time-oriented facet” of it, Tulving & Kim, 2007), both being forms of consciousness 
that imply awareness of self in time, the difference being about an “emphasis” on self in the 
former case and on subjective time in the latter (Tulving, 2002a). Tulving noted that this 
distinction was subtle and speculative, and the rest of the chapter did not discuss further how 
autonoetic awareness and chronesthesia might be dissociated (Tulving, 2002). Furthermore, 
it was proposed that both autonoesis and chronesthesia should be impaired in amnesic 
patients. The concept of chronesthesia was not mentioned in later discussions of future-
oriented thought (e.g., Szpunar & Tulving, 2011), when autonoetic awareness was given the 
central role.  
  
Commentary: In line with Tulving’s later ideas (see below), recent evidence suggests that 
semantic memory contributes significantly to past and future thought (Abraham, Schubotz, & 
von Cramon, 2008; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013; Klein, 2013; 
Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013; Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 
2014; Wang, Yue, & Huang, 2016). For instance, due to his preserved semantic knowledge, it 
was reported that amnesic patient KC understood time as a concept, and could correctly order 
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events on a timeline (Craver, Kwan, Steindam, & Rosenbaum, 2014). This is not in 
disagreement with Tulving’s perspective, who reported that patients without autonoetic 
awareness such as K.C. had “no difficulty with the concept of chronological time” (Tulving, 
1985b; see also Tulving, 2001b) and went on to propose that “semantic memory also allows 
an individual to construct possible future worlds” (Tulving, 2005) through chronognosia, 
defined as semantic knowledge about physical time (Tulving, 2002a; see above). KC “thus 
exhibits a dissociation between knowing time and experiencing time” (Tulving, 2001b). As 
discussed in Tulving (2005), “no kind of memory other than episodic has any special relation 
to time. Semantic memory allows the individual to know, at Time 2, something about what 
happened at an earlier time, Time 1, but it does not allow the individual to remember what 
happened. Semantic memory also allows an individual to construct possible future worlds, but 
since it is lacking autonoetic capability, it would not allow the individual to mentally travel into 
his own personal future”. Amnesic patients with medial temporal lesions have indeed been 
shown to be able to list relevant issues about the future but to provide impoverished 
descriptions when asked to elaborate about this factual knowledge (Race, et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, patients with semantic dementia (see section 2.2) also have difficulties 
constructing detailed novel future scenarios, despite relatively intact episodic memory (Irish 
et al., 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013). Semantic memory thus seems to provide the “scaffolding” 
necessary to construct and simulate future events (Irish, et al., 2012), consistent with 
Tulving’s idea that episodic memory “operations depend on” (Tulving, 2001b) and “require” 





Episodic or Autobiographical Memory? 
From his first writings, Tulving defined episodic memory in term of its “autobiographical 
reference”, in contrast with semantic memory and its “cognitive reference” (Tulving, 1972). 
The examples used by Tulving to illustrate what episodic memory was were mostly examples 
of autobiographical memories (“Last year, while on summer vacation, I met a retired sea 
captain who knew more jokes than any other person I have ever met”; Tulving, 1972), and also 
some examples of laboratory experiments (“One of the words I am sure I saw in the first list I 
studied was legend”; Tulving, 1972). Tulving (1983) later noted that he favored the phrase 
episodic memory for “the relative brevity of the term” as compared to “autobiographical 
memory” that suffers from “its connotations of a literary account of one’s life” (Tulving, 1983, 
page 28).  
When describing typical laboratory studies of episodic memory, in which participants have to 
remember “miniature events” (Tulving, 1983, page 144) such as a word’s occurrence in a list, 
Tulving considered such an occurrence to be “an autobiographical episode” (Tulving, 1972). 
Thus, in these writings and later (e.g., Tulving, 1995, table 54.1, where “autobiographical” is 
listed as another term for episodic memory) no conceptual distinction is made between 
laboratory studies of episodic memory and studies of autobiographical memory in terms of 
their relation to the general concept of episodic memory. Tulving discussed this and related 
issues in his 1983 book and concluded that laboratory studies are a valid way to examine 
episodic memory: “I know no compelling reasons why the general principles that apply to 
remembering of mini-events in the laboratory should be greatly different from those 
governing the remembering of real-like experiences” (Tulving, 1983, page 146). 
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Tulving later made reference to Cermak and colleagues (Cermak, 1986; Cermak & O'Connor, 
1983) in support of the idea that the semantic-episodic distinction applies to autobiographical 
memory, drawing a distinction between autobiographical episodes and personal semantic 
memories (Tulving et al., 1988), the latter being partly preserved in amnesic patient KC, as 
well as in some other amnesic patients described in the literature at the time (such as patient 
S.S. in Cermak & O’Connor, 1983). However, no conceptual distinction is drawn between non-
personal semantic memories and autobiographical knowledge, or between episodic 
memories and autobiographical episodes.  
 
Commentary: The fields of (laboratory-based) episodic memory and autobiographical 
memory have developed in parallel over the last three decades. Principles of memory derived 
from the laboratory have proven useful in the study of “real life” memory in areas as diverse 
as eye-witness testimony (e.g., Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015),  
classroom learning  (e.g., Karpicke & Blunt, 2011) and singular public events (e.g., Talarico & 
Rubin, 2003). Moreover, most investigators recognize the large overlap in the neural circuits 
underpinning recollection, as this is operationalized in the laboratory and autobiographical 
memory retrieval (Moscovitch, et al., 2016; supplemental Figure 4a versus 4b; Rugg & Vilberg, 
2013; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006), even though some differences have been 
described (Cabeza, et al., 2004; X. Y. Chen, Gilmore, Nelson, & McDermott, 2017; Gilboa, 
2004; McDermott, Szpunar, & Christ, 2009). It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to 
match autobiographical memory and laboratory-based tasks in term of processing demands, 
such as stimulus elaboration (while participants in autobiographical memory experiments 
may take 5-10 seconds to re-experience a memory, processing times are typically much 
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shorter in lab-based experimental designs; Conway et al., 2002; Svoboda et al., 2006) or 
remoteness of study episodes (in lab-based tests, stimuli are typically experienced only a 
short time before the test, whereas autobiographical retrieval can reach back over decades).  
 
2.3. Re-conceptualizations of semantic memory 
Although Tulving elaborated and re-conceptualized the constructs of both episodic and 
semantic memory and their relation over the years, he had a clear focus on episodic memory, 
which he fully recognized. As he noted for example in the first chapter of “Elements of 
Episodic memory”: “The kind of memory that is involved in remembering past events is called 
episodic memory. This is what this book is about” (Tulving, 1983, page 1). Nonetheless, we 
note below two examples of reconceptualizations of semantic memory, both of which 
resonate with contemporary perspectives. 
 
Semantic memory is knowledge of the world 
In contrast to his earlier conceptualizations (see section 1) that strongly associated semantic 
memory with language (Tulving, 1972), Tulving proposed in his 1983 book that semantic 
memory would be better referred to as general “knowledge of the world” (see also Tulving, 
1985b; 1987b; 1995; 2005) to avoid association with the linguistic definition of semantics and 
too tight an association with language. As Tulving notes, “we know many things about the 
world that are neither meaningful, nor readily expressed in words or other symbols” (Tulving, 




Commentary: As noted above (see section 1), this latter conceptualization of semantic 
memory is in keeping with current perspectives that propose that the ability to assign 
meaning to percepts does not necessarily depend on language (e.g., Binder & Desai, 2011; 
Lambon Ralph, et al., 2017; Martin, 2007, 2016). Interestingly, most of the examples of tasks 
tapping semantic memory in the 1983 book still involved language, and certain tasks such as 
naming or lexical decision tasks would not be classified as semantic stricto sensu as of today, 
as they do not require participants to process meaning (reviewed in Renoult, 2016). 
Nonetheless, the point was clearly made that this broader consideration of semantic memory 
as knowledge of the world opens the floodgates to a wide variety of tasks that can be 
construed as depending on semantic memory  (e.g., sentence verification, naming of category 
instances, production of opposites, concrete-abstract decision, feature-dimension decisions 
(such as judgements on real world size or indoors/outdoors classification), etc.) whereas 
episodic memory is typically evaluated with tests of recall and recognition. 
 
Semantic memory is culturally shared 
In 1983, Tulving highlighted the culturally shared nature of semantic memory, which was 
considered to be “independent of a person’s identity” (page 9), and thus reflective of “the 
responses made by other members of the language community in the same situation” (page 
25; see also Tulving, 1987b). Similarly, in the precis of ‘Elements of Episodic memory’, Tulving 





Commentary: The idea that the content of semantic memory is largely shared between 
members of a culture is consistent with current perspectives, and inter-individual variations 
in semantic knowledge have been somewhat neglected (but see Hampton, 1979; K. E. 
Johnson & Mervis, 1997; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). However, this definition of semantic 
memory is inconsistent with the idea mentioned above that the semantic-episodic distinction 
applies to autobiographical memory, exemplified in the distinction between autobiographical 
episodes and personal semantic memories (Tulving et al., 1988), as personal semantics are 
presumably specific to an individual. That being said, whereas early descriptions assumed that 
personal semantics should be considered as expressions of semantic memory, more recent 
data suggest that this view may be an oversimplification (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Renoult, 
Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012).  
 
2.4. Re-conceptualization of the relationship between episodic and semantic memory  
 
Context dependency does not necessarily dissociate episodic and semantic memory 
In his 1983 book, Tulving noted that, in contra-distinction to semantic memory, episodic 
memory is often considered to be context-dependent (e.g., Ehrlich, 1979; Kintsch, 1980), as 
defined by “the tendency for the processing of a unit of information (e.g., its encoding, or 
retrieval) to be influenced by other units of information that are present at the time of 
processing” (Tulving, 1983, page 44). However, he expressed doubts about the usefulness of 
this distinction and noted that “knowledge of the world may be as context-dependent as is 
our knowledge of the past” (Tulving, 1983, page 45). Tulving supported this view by citing 
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research published at the time that demonstrated context effects in semantic processing. This 
included studies reporting that how the meaning of a word is processed (and how a specific 
meaning is selected) depends on its presentation context (Schvaneveldt, Meyer, & Becker, 
1976), as well as studies reporting analogous priming effects for semantic and episodic 
memory (Mckoon & Ratcliff, 1979). Moreover, Tulving rejected the idea that, in his words, 
“whenever a word is seen, heard, spoken, written (…) the same underlying representation is 
either fully or partially activated” (Tulving, 1983, page 241), and proposed instead that 
semantic representations could be “recorded in many different forms, and that there is no 
necessary and direct connection between and among separate representations of one and the 
same lexical unit” (Tulving, 1983, page 241).  
 
Commentary: Episodic memory is still often defined in terms of its context-sensitivity, a 
property that semantic memory is held to lack (see Wheeler & Ploran, 2009). Note however 
that context can have multiple meanings (Baddeley, 1982). It can refer to the context of initial 
acquisition, which typically is not considered to be included in a semantic memory 
representation (e.g., where/when one initially learned what autonoesis meant), while such 
contextual information is a defining feature of episodic recollection. Context-sensitivity can 
also refer to the fact that retrieved content can differ depending on the retrieval cues “that 
are present at the time of processing” (Tulving, 1983, page 44). From this perspective, 
semantic memory is indeed context-dependent, as noted by Tulving. The meaning attributed 
to a particular stimulus event is clearly affected by the context of its presentation (such as the 
context provided by single words or sentence clauses preceding a target word, e.g., Bentin, 
McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), as well as by 
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current emotional state (e.g., Chwilla, Virgillito, & Vissers, 2011; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 
2007). Moreover, semantic control mechanisms, which bias meaning selection, are a crucial 
component of semantic memory (reviewed in Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph, et al., 2017).  
 
Episodic and Semantic retrieval depend on different retrieval mechanisms 
In his 1983 book Tulving proposed that access to semantic memory is automatic (such as 
accessing meaning when reading words), but that access to episodic memory tends to be 
deliberate and to require “conscious effort” . He further proposed that retrieval required that 
the rememberer was in “retrieval mode”, a cognitive state that enables internal and external 
events to be processed as retrieval cues (Tulving, 1983; page 46). Tulving recognized that little 
was known (at the time) about retrieval mode, “other than it constitutes a necessary condition 
for retrieval” (Tulving, 1983, page 169), and that the rememberer has “no awareness of 
retrieval mode” (Tulving, 1983, page 170). He further noted later in precis of “Elements of 
episodic memory” that “all retrieval is cued” and that “an important problem lies in the 
identification of invisible cues” (Tulving, 1984). 
 
Commentary: Research on semantic memory has confirmed that words and other conceptual 
stimuli can activate their meanings automatically, in the sense that “semantic activation” is 
unaffected by intention to access meaning (see Neely, 1991; Neely & Kahan, 2001 for 
reviews). Recent research has demonstrated that episodic memories can also be retrieved 
unintentionally, and that such involuntary memories (spontaneous recollections of the past 
that are seemingly not associated with a conscious search) are relatively common (e.g., 
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Berntsen, 1996, 2009; Mace, 2004; Mace, Atkinson, Moeckel, & Torres, 2011). Note that this 
is not totally in contradiction with Tulving’s views, in that he commented that “the absence 
of goal-directed cognitive activity” may be sufficient to “place the episodic system into the 
‘retrieval mode’” (Tulving, 1983; page 46). However, the definition of involuntary memories 
as being independent of consciously-mediated search partially contradicts Tulving’s notion 
that access to episodic memory “usually requires conscious effort” (Tulving, 1983; page 46). 
As mentioned above, very little was known at the time about retrieval mode (Tulving, 1983). 
Since then, it has has been operationalised as a tonic state that is maintained during a retrieval 
task with neural correlates that can be revealed by contrasts between appropriately matched 
episodic and a non-episodic tasks (Rugg & Wilding, 2000, see also section 2.5 on the neural 
correlates of episodic memory).  
 
Semantic processing always precedes episodic encoding 
Tulving (1972) proposed that whereas episodic memory encoding might often be influenced 
by semantic processing, there are situations where this would not be the case (e.g. the 
sensory elements of an experience might be remembered without relying on the semantic 
system). In the 1983 book however he proposed that episodes almost invariably have 
semantic content, and thus that episodic memory encoding typically entails engagement of 
semantic memory (Tulving, 1983, pages 29 to 31). Nonetheless, Tulving at that time still 
considered that events could be encoded in episodic memory, “even if the meaning of the 
occurrence is unknown” (Tulving, 1983, page 37),  a proposal consistent with what he later 
framed as the “parallel hypothesis” (see Tulving, 1987b). By contrast, comprehension of an 
event and relating its content to existing knowledge is a necessary precursor to semantic 
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encoding. Episodic memory encoding was thus held to be more direct (“experiential”, Tulving, 
1983, page 41) than semantic memory. Tulving made the further point that while simple 
perceptual events could be encoded directly into episodic memory, more complex events, 
such as those extending over a significant period of time, necessitate interpretation by the 
semantic system if they are to be successfully encoded in episodic memory (Tulving, 1983, 
page 38).  
Later elaborations of his theory, as articulated in what became the “SPI model” (for 
Serial Parallel Independent; Tulving, 1993a, 1995, 2001a, 2005; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998), 
and initially referred to as the “embeddedness hypothesis” (Tulving, 1984b, 1985a, 1987b), 
proposed that all perceptual information passes through the semantic system before it is 
encoded in episodic memory (that is, the information is serially encoded). Information 
entering semantic memory is derived exclusively from “perceptual systems”, and thus, 
contrary to Tulving’s initial view (Tulving, 1972), perceptual information is not encoded in 
episodic memory until it has been “interpreted” by semantic memory (Tulving, 2001a). The 
output of the semantic memory system then serves as input to the episodic system, which 
“computes the temporo-spatial contextual coordinates of the incoming information in relation 
to already existing episodic information, or to the self” (Tulving, 1995). The SPI model 
stipulates that information in each system is then stored in parallel in different brain regions. 
During retrieval, the two systems are considered to operate independently of each other. 
Thus, Tulving and Markowitsch (1998) argued that, in cases of anterograde memory 
impairment, semantic and episodic memory might both be impaired, or semantic memory 
might be spared (as, they claim is the case in developmental amnesia; Elward & Vargha-
Khadem, 2018; VarghaKhadem, et al., 1997, but see below). They were adamant, however, 
that the reverse could not occur, that is, impaired semantic memory in the face of spared 
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episodic memory. As noted below, this prediction seems not to have stood the test of time.  
Finally, Tulving and Markowitsch (1998) proposed that awareness associated with episodic 
and semantic memory is also embedded, such that remembering (episodic retrieval) always 
implies knowing (semantic retrieval), but not vice-versa (e.g., one could have general 
knowledge that the Sahara is hot, without having related episodic memories; see section 2.2). 
Therefore, episodic memory “includes but goes beyond knowledge of the world” (Tulving & 
Markowitsch, 1998). 
 
Commentary: The proposition that new episodic memories cannot be acquired without 
semantic memory is difficult to reconcile with findings of relatively preserved new 
(anterograde) episodic memory learning in semantic dementia patients (Adlam, Patterson, & 
Hodges, 2009; Graham, Simons, Pratt, Patterson, & Hodges, 2000; Irish, et al., 2016; Simons, 
Graham, Galton, Patterson, & Hodges, 2001; Simons, et al., 2002), who suffer from a 
progressive deterioration of semantic and conceptual knowledge. In these studies, semantic 
dementia patients were reported to form episodic memories for events and stimuli that they 
failed to comprehend. However, as mentioned by Tulving (2001), the tests used in these 
studies do not necessarily rely on recollection (e.g., rich re-experiencing of episodic details or 
source memory), as tests of recognition memory (Adlam, Patterson, & Hodges, 2009; Graham 
et al., 2000; Simons et al., 2001) or visual memory (the Rey complex figure in Irish et al., 2016) 
can be supported by familiarity (i.e., a sense of prior exposure bereft of contextual details; 
but see Simons, et al., 2002 for evidence of preserved source memory in some semantic 
dementia patients). Moreover, as discussed by Adlam et al. (2009), until advanced stages of 
the disease (when episodic memory may be impaired too, e.g., Maguire, Kumaran, Hassabis, 
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& Kopelman, 2010), patients still have some preserved knowledge that could be used to 
facilitate episodic encoding, as well as preserved perceptual memory (cf. Tulving, 2001). Thus, 
the findings from semantic dementia are not totally incompatible with the SPI model, 
although they suggest that at least some forms of “episodic-like” learning are possible even 
when semantic processing is impaired.   
 Another assumption of the SPI perspective is that anterograde amnesia can impact 
episodic memory while sparing new semantic learning. Evidence for this claims rest mainly on 
reports of individuals with “developmental amnesia” following damage to the hippocampus 
early in life (see Elward & Vargha-Khadem, 2018 for review). These individuals perform poorly 
on laboratory tests of episodic memory while demonstrating normal performance on non-
episodic tasks such as reading, spelling and comprehension. Whereas these features of 
developmental amnesia might point to normal semantic learning that is independent of 
episodic memory (something that has rarely if ever been reported in the adult amnesia 
literature; e.g., Bayley, O'Reilly, Curran, & Squire, 2008; but see Tulving, 1993b and Tulving et 
al., 1988 for descriptions of some semantic learning in patient KC), it has been noted that this 
dissociation may reflect the contribution to semantic learning of degraded, but not absent, 
episodic memory supported by a partially functioning hippocampus (e.g., Squire & Zola, 1998; 
Vargha-Khadem, et al., 2003). This interpretation of semantic learning in developmental 
amnesia, seemingly in contradiction to the SPI model, relies on the assumption that 
declarative memories initially depend on the hippocampus before being consolidated in the 
neocortex (McClelland, et al., 1995; Sekeres, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2018; Squire, Genzel, 
Wixted, & Morris, 2015). For instance, according to the “trace transformation” hypothesis 
(Sekeres, et al., 2018; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011), semantic knowledge emerges from 
episodic memory with time and experience (reviewed in Renoult, et al., 2019; Sekeres, et al., 
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2018; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011). The theory proposes that, in some cases, both the 
original and the semanticized version of a memory may co-exist and interact in response to 
current task demands, but that all declarative memories (including semantic memories) 
initially depend on the hippocampus. One possibility, suggested by Elward & Vargha-Khadem 
(2018) is that even though this initial reliance on the hippocampus may hold in adults, the 
memory systems of children with developmental amnesia may develop differently, optimizing 
semantic learning in the presence of early hippocampal damage. However, these patients are 
nonetheless slow to learn new semantic information when assessed in laboratory settings, 
and presumably depend on incremental cortical learning (Elward & Vargha-Khadem, 2018). 
 
Episodic memory emerges later in development than semantic memory  
In later writings, the topic of the development of episodic memory received significant 
attention in Tulving’s work (e.g., Tulving, 2005; M. A. Wheeler, et al., 1997), although he did 
not directly contribute to research on this topic himself. Tulving proposed that the 
development of long-term memory systems began with an initial reliance on a “stimulus 
driven” procedural system, followed by development of semantic memory and, finally,  
episodic memory (M. A. Wheeler, et al., 1997). He related the development of semantic 
memory and noetic awareness to the Piagetian notion of object permanence, something that 
infants acquire around 8 months (Piaget, 1954), and to the ability of infants to perform 
deferred imitation from around 9 months (Meltzoff, 1988). He considered both of these 
capacities to rely on the existence of mental representations of objects in their absence. 
Tulving further proposed that, even though there may be evidence for memory of events 
relatively early during development (from around 1 to 2 years old), this was supported by 
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semantic as opposed to episodic memory. This early form of event memory is typically 
expressed non-verbally, or involves recall of words or short phrases identical to those initially 
studied (Bauer & Wewerka, 1995; Howe & Courage, 1993). Tulving also noted that young 
children typically do not perform well on tests of source memory before around the age of 5. 
That is, despite being able to remember the events that they studied, young children are poor 
at remembering the study context (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; 
Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). Similarly, Tulving (2005) observed that prior to around 5-
6 years of age, few children understand the difference between Remembering and Knowing 
(C. N. Johnson & Wellman, 1980). He discussed research on the “mirror test” in infants 
(Gallup, 1970) and noted that the awareness of one’s physical appearance and of “the 
constancy of that appearance through time and space” that infants display around 18 months 
is a necessary precursor to autonoetic awareness (M. A. Wheeler, et al., 1997). In other words, 
autonoetic awareness, defined as the ability “to become aware” of one’s “existence in 
subjectively experienced time”, must “include but transcend self-awareness” (Tulving, 2001b). 
Autonoetic awareness itself emerges on rarely before around 4 years of age (as described in 
Tulving, 2005; see also Tulving, 2002) and then progressively matures.  
 
Commentary: The observation that episodic memory develops later than semantic memory, 
and only in association with the development of a sense of self in time (Fivush, 2011; Howe 
& Courage, 1993, 1997; Nelson & Fivush, 2004), is uncontroversial and largely consistent with 
the literature on autobiographical memory development that typically operationalizes 
episodic memory in term of phenomenological aspects of recollection (Fivush, 2011). 
Consistent with Tulving’s writings, infants may be able to show memory for specific events, 
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for instance memories for sequences of actions demonstrated through deferred imitation 
(Bauer, 2007), but this ability depends on semantic rather than episodic memory (Newcombe, 
Lloyd, & Ratliff, 2007). In other words, such memories may depend on knowledge and 
understanding of the action sequence, rather than on the specific context of its acquisition. 
Some authors have argued that generalization of what is learned (such as understanding that 
the word cat applies to different exemplars) is more important from an adaptive point of view 
than remembering the specific circumstances in which the information was learned, and thus 
should develop earlier (Keresztes, Ngo, Lindenberger, Werkle-Bergner, & Newcombe, 2018; 
Newcombe, et al., 2007). The capacity to remember events experienced from a first person 
perspective of oneself mentally travelling through time (relying on autonoetic awareness) has 
been held to emerge later, around the end of preschool years (Atance & O'Neill, 2005; Fivush, 
2011), consistent with Tulving’s estimation of emergence around 4 years old. Moreover, this 
ability develops progressively, with more autobiographical features and references to spatial 
and temporal contexts being reported by children as they develop (Bauer, 2007; Nelson & 
Fivush, 2004; Newcombe, et al., 2007; Ngo, Horner, Newcombe, & Olson, 2019). These 
findings are arguably consistent with recent observations that the development of episodic 
memory correlates with the maturation of hippocampal subfields (Canada, Ngo, Newcombe, 
Geng, & Riggins, 2018; Keresztes, et al., 2018; Lee, Ekstrom, & Ghetti, 2014).  
 
2.5. Neural correlates of Episodic Memory 
The episodic-semantic distinction was originally framed at the functional level (Tulving, 1972), 
and only later was it explicitly proposed that the two systems should be differentiable at the 
structural (neural) level also (Tulving, 1983; 1986). Subsequently, Tulving and colleagues 
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helped pioneer the application of functional neuroimaging to the study of such memory 
dissociations. Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1997) reviewed the available neuropsychological 
and functional neuroimaging evidence and concluded that the prefrontal cortex played a 
crucial role in episodic memory and, especially, in autonoetic awareness. Tulving, Kapur, 
Craik, Moscovitch, and Houle (1994) proposed that left prefrontal regions played a key role in 
episodic encoding, whereas right prefrontal regions supported the maintenance of episodic 
retrieval mode (see section 2.4). These ideas were formalized in the Hemispheric 
Encoding/Retrieval Asymmetry (HERA) model (Habib, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2003; Lepage, 
Ghaffar, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2000; Nyberg, et al., 1996; Nyberg & Tulving, 1996; Tulving, Kapur, 
Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994). Because episodic encoding was held to necessitate 
semantic retrieval (see section 2.4), the model implied that left prefrontal regions also played 
an important role in semantic retrieval (Tulving, et al., 1994).  
Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1997) proposed that while prefrontal regions support autonoetic 
awareness, memory “contents” were represented in posterior cortical regions. These 
posterior regions would be “permeated” by autonoetic awareness during ecphory (Wheeler 
et al., 1997). Levine et al. (1998) reported evidence from a brain lesioned patient that 
supported a role for frontal cortex - especially in the right hemisphere - in autonoetic 
awareness, but specifically noted that the uncinate fascicle, the white matter tract linking 
temporal and frontal regions, might in fact be the crucial structure underlying recollective 
experience. More recently, Nyberg, Kim, Habib, Levine & Tulving (2010) argued it was left 
parietal and frontal regions that were involved in mental time travel and the sense of 
subjective time (although a reviewer noted that this study included only 5 participants). 
Consistent with current perspectives, Tulving recognized the important role of the 
hippocampus in ‘’enabling the operations of episodic memory” (Tulving & Markowitsch, 
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1998). Moreover, based on a meta-analysis of PET studies, Lepage, Habib and Tulving (1998) 
proposed the HIPER (Hippocampal Encoding/Retrieval) model, according to which the 
anterior hippocampus is more involved in encoding and the posterior hippocampus in 
retrieval. In addition to examining episodic retrieval with PET and fMRI, Tulving and his 
colleagues also contributed to the investigation of episodic memory using event related 
potentials (ERPs; e.g., Duzel, et al., 1999; Duzel, et al., 2001; Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, 
Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; A. S. N. Kim, Vallesi, Picton, & Tulving, 2009). 
 
Commentary: 
Early neuroimaging studies of memory were constrained by the need to use PET 
methodology, which provides no easy way to separate item- and state-related neural activity 
or to study the neural correlates of successful versus unsuccessful encoding and retrieval. 
Partly for these reasons, the early observations of Tulving and colleagues have not all stood 
the test of time. For instance, in the case of HERA, while left prefrontal regions are considered 
to play an important role in semantic control (e.g., Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph, et al., 2017), 
right prefrontal cortex appear to be implicated in post-retrieval monitoring rather than, or in 
addition to, the maintenance of a retrieval mode (e.g., Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Rugg, 2004). 
It should be noted, however, that a key prediction arising from the notion of retrieval mode 
– that episodic retrieval should be associated with evidence for neural activity that is 
sustained across successive retrieval attempts – motivated fMRI studies employing hybrid 
block- and trial-wise designs to separately identify item- and state-related retrieval-related 
neural activity (Donaldson, Petersen, Ollinger, & Buckner, 2001; Velanova, et al., 2003; 
Woodruff, Uncapher, & Rugg, 2006; see Duzel, 2000 for an analoguous ERP study). Notably, 
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Velanova et al. (2003) reported that, relative to an easy retrieval test (recognition of words 
presented on multiple study occasions), a more difficult test (recognition of once-studied 
words) was associated with sustained activity in a widely distributed set of regions that 
included right lateral PFC. It is also noteworthy that while the HERA framework has largely 
been subsumed by more detailed  models of retrieval processing, direct evidence in support 
of the framework (at least, for young adults) was provided by findings from two transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies (Rossi, et al., 2001; Sandrini, Cappa, Rossi, Rossini, & 
Miniussi, 2003). 
Arguably, the HIPER model has fared better. While criticized at the time (Schacter & Wagner, 
1999), the question of the longitudinal specialization of the hippocampus remains an 
important topic of contemporary investigation (e.g., Brunec, et al., 2018; Poppenk, 
Evensmoen, Moscovitch, & Nadel, 2013), and an updated version of HIPER has recently been 
advanced (HERNET; Kim, 2015). Perhaps more important than any single empirical 
contribution, though, Tulving deserves credit for his role in illustrating the potential and utility 
of non-invasive functional neuroimaging methods in the study of human memory. 
 
Conclusion 
We have reviewed Endel Tulving’s writings on the semantic-episodic distinction, from his first 
book chapter in 1972 to the various later elaborations of his theory. Numerous aspects of the 
theory evolved over the years, but it is striking how many of the ideas and concepts developed 
by Tulving permeate contemporary cognitive neuroscience models of memory. Of 
importance, although Tulving’s contribution to declarative memory research is sometimes 
summarized in terms of a rigid distinction between semantic and episodic memory, it is clear 
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that from his earliest publications (Tulving, 1972) he recognized that the two forms of 
memory are highly interactive, and likely share functional properties and neural 
underpinnings. Moreover, one of the most important aspects of the theory is the idea that 
these interactions lie at the heart of adaptive declarative memory function. As he expressed 
it in 1985, “both the general nature and specific characteristics of recollective experience (the 
phenomenal experience of remembering a past event) are determined jointly by episodic and 
semantic information” (Tulving, 1985). 
Tulving’s view that it is not necessary to assume “that the distinction between knowing 
and remembering is always sharp” (Tulving, 2005) and that the distinction may be “subtle” 
(M. A. Wheeler, et al., 1997) is consistent with current perspectives that semantic and 
episodic memory are closely intertwined, yet maintain a degree of distinctiveness (for a 
recent review, see Renoult, et al., 2019). Given the extensive overlap in their neural 
substrates, an important question for future research will be to understand the 
neurocognitive mechanism of mental time travel and other phenomenological aspects of 
remembering, the features of episodic memory Tulving considered to be its most important 
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